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Promises and Problems in
Alternative Dispute Resolution
for the Elderly
Is there a place for mediation a
arbitration in elder law? These
other alternative dispute resolut
methods may save money, stres,
heartache for seniors involved i
disputes concerning care, placer
guardianship, and estate matter
By Kevin Gibson
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involving the elderly'. Mediation has been singled
out as a desirable dispute resolution process in
cases of out-of-home placement, family caregiving,
guardianship, and inheritance.' Here, I will
describe some of the main forms of ADR, note
some benefits it may bring, and then show prob-
lems that individuals and attorneys may encounter
in dealing with ADR. Finally, I will suggest some
guidelines for appropriate and inappropriate appli-
cations of ADR.
What Is ADR?
S. ADR is a term that encompasses a broad spectrum
of practices aimed at managing conflict. Several
different approaches can be found within this spec-
trum. They are "alternative" in that they avoid theformal mechanisms of litigation and courts for res-
of culture olution of civil disputes. The central common fea-
one must ture is that all ADR processes are voluntary and
sters and therefore, all parties must assent to them. In addi-
tion, all ADR practices introduce a third party into
the resolution procedure. The particular form and
-PLATO 1  scope of ADR are chosen by the parties themselves.
They may decide on the degree of privacy involved,
ant outlays and the amount of control they have over the
ain in tak- process and outcome. Broadly speaking, ADR
spute reso- forms a continuum from processes that mimic for-
ailed as a mal court proceedings where a judgment is handed
ficts, from down from a third party, to those where the princi-
,ard spats. pals craft their own solutions, as in mediation.'
r disputes Some contracts now mandate ADR prior to lit-
................................. igation and courts also may mandate it. However,
nd Assistant ADR does not supplant traditional litigation' and
rsity in judicial adjudication. Instead, it is an ancillary
ed ethics, means of resolving disputes.7
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Arbitration
An arbitrator is a third party who will render a
decision or make an award. The arbitrator is mutu-
ally and voluntarily accepted by the parties, who
agree to be bound by his or her ruling in the case.
Arbitrators can be anyone the parties agree to.
Sometimes it may be beneficial for the parties to
employ a nonlawyer who has expertise in a sub-
stantive area, such as a social worker in cases of
long-term care plans. Often though, retired judges
or lawyers will be chosen because of their experi-
ence in assessing the merits of both sides of an
issue.
While retaining the litigation-like aspect of a
third party imposing a decision, arbitration offers
greater flexibility than litigation. The arbitrator is
usually not bound by legal rules of evidence or pro-
cedure, and the parties themselves can agree to the
procedures they will use regarding discovery, pre-
sentation of evidence, resolution of motions, and
other matters. Yet, arbitration is quasi-judicial, and
parties may have legal representatives make their
case or assist them in presenting it.
A variant of arbitration, known for its use in
professional sports negotiations, is called "final
offer" or "last best offer" arbitration. Here, the
parties can make several rounds of offers. If they
fail to reach agreement, they then each present a
"last best offer" to the arbitrator who chooses
between them.
There are also a number of hybrid processes.
Non-binding arbitration, for example, allows the
parties to find out what sort of award might be
made by a third party. They then can choose to
accept an arbitrated settlement as presented, con-
tinue negotiating, or move to litigation. Med-arb
combines mediation and arbitration in sequence.
That is, if mediation fails to reach complete settle-
ment, the mediator schedules a separate meeting
and rules on those issues as a binding arbitrator.
Neutral fact-finding is an informal process where
an individual selected by the courts is asked to
make a report. This can be a voluntary process
advanced by the parties, or may be initiated by the
courts as described under Rule 706 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence. A variant on neutral fact-find-
ing is early neutral evaluation, a process in which
the courts appoint an evaluator who meets with
both sides and ascertains areas of agreement. The
evaluator gives both sides candid assessments of
the strengths and weaknesses of their case, the pos-
sible range of liability, and suggestions as to how
the parties might expedite settlement.' A mini-trial
mimics formal court proceedings and is held before
a neutral decision-maker who is often a retired
judge, but usually without a jury. Similar to a mini-
trial, a summary jury trial is not really a trial, but
rather a structured settlement process. At pretrial
conference, a judge may encourage or require that
parties to a pending case hold one." The summary
jury trial is usually held after discovery is complete,
when both parties are ready to proceed to trail. The
process involves a jury, typically impaneled from
the regular list, that may not be aware that their
decision is merely advisory. In truncated proceed-
ings, attorneys present their arguments briefly, and
rebuttal and reply are allowed. The judge instructs
the jury, and once they render a verdict, the judge
and the attorneys are allowed to question them
about their perceptions of the case and the effec-
tiveness of the presentations. Most often, after
minitrials and summary jury trials, the presiding
officer meets with the parties to foster settlement in
light of the new information about the strength of
their cases and potential risks in an actual court
proceeding.
Negotiation Theory and Roles
A common feature of these forms of ADR is that
they operate within a framework of conventional
negotiation theory. The working assumption is that
there is a "fixed pie" of assets or resources, and the
main purpose of a negotiator is to maximize his or
her share. Each party will have a reserve price,
below which they would rather walk away from
the deal. If both parties are willing to accept a given
trade, then there is a "positive bargaining zone"
and a deal should take place, even if the offer does
not match some amount that they would ideally
like to pay or receive. Often, the negotiation is
thought of as a win/lose endeavor, where a gain for
one side is perceived as a loss for the other. The
parties stake positions and may get emotionally
attached to them, with the result that any conces-
sion is considered a sign of weakness. Under-
standably, this kind of approach fosters posturing,
bluffing, and brinkmanship.
One value of an arbitrator, then, is that when
parties recognize that it is in their interest to come
to a deal, but reach an impasse over the precise
terms, they can turn to a third party to determine
the appropriate distribution. Arbitration is typical-
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ly less emotionally charged than face-to-face nego-
tiation, largely because the parties are making their
case to a neutral third party rather than to someone
they perceive as an adversary. Arbitrators can also
serve a useful function in diffusing or deflecting the
animosity of a contentious negotiation, since it may
be more acceptable to have a negotiator explain
that particular concessions or a suboptimal out-
come was the result of a third party's ruling rather
than their shortcomings. A number of these proce-
dures act as "reality checks" so that negotiators
can make more realistic assessments of the likely
outcomes and the strength of their cases, and thus
make more rational choices about whether to settle
or continue with litigation.
Arbitration can be much more efficient than lit-
igation, because parties can achieve settlement
rapidly and at less cost. Arbitration may also be
less contentious than adversarial procedures.
Arbitration echoes formal litigation, and works
best when the issues are distributive, in the sense
that there is a limited amount of resources to be
shared among the parties. However, parties should
realize that courts are very reluctant to interfere
with a decision to which the parties have voluntar-
ily assented. The basis of state legislation favorable
to arbitration is the Uniform Arbitration Act,
adopted by the Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws and endorsed by the American Bar
Association (ABA) in 1955. Under the Act, a judge
is required to enforce a binding, voluntary arbitra-
tion award, and opportunities to challenge the
award are limited to grounds such as fraud or cor-
ruption." Parties may potentially be bound by a
settlement that they believe to be unjust without
any legal recourse. Furthermore, arbitrated cases
have no precedential force, and so outcomes may
vary widely from case to case, even if fact patterns
are similar.
Ombudsman
An ombudsman typically is a third party sponsored
by an institution to act as a fact finder or adjuster.
Although ombudsmen may be salaried, they are
professionally neutral. They investigate complaints
or grievances from an institution's constituents,
employees, or clients. Typically they use informal
means and make non-binding recommendations to
senior management. Their prime allegiance is not
to the institution as such, but rather to the facts,
natural justice, and equity for the constituents.' 2
The ombudsman does not just deal in griev-
ances, but is open to all kinds of problems. Usually,
ombudsmen deal with those who feel less powerful
than others in an atmosphere that seeks to protect
complainants from retribution. Because of the con-
cern for confidentiality, very few records are kept,
and most ombudsmen resist appearing as witnesses
in judicial proceedings. While they have little
power to unilaterally alter decisions, they work
through both formal and informal channels to alert
the organization to problems and advocate for vic-
tims of an injustice. Their functions include hearing
the issues of a dispute or grievance, which may be
important if the client's main interest is in "vent-
ing" their problem rather than seeking redress; pro-
viding and receiving information, to clarify institu-
tional policies, for example, or hear about unsafe
practices; reviewing options with any party; pro-
viding referrals to experts or other resources; and
providing direct assistance to solve practical prob-
lems.'3 Assisting clients might be as straightforward
as helping them write a letter. In other cases the
ombudsman may act as a mediator or broker a set-
tlement through "shuttle diplomacy," representing
the views of each party to the other without any
direct confrontation. A good deal of an ombuds-
man's work will involve fact-finding. For instance,
an ombudsman may establish whether a payment
was made on time, or whether a client is entitled to
a subsidy, or who made a particular decision.
The federal government initiated its use of
ombudsmen in 1972. The Ombudsman Program is
now established in all states under the Older
Americans Act, administered by the
Administration on Aging (AoA) specifically to
advocate on behalf of older residents of long-term
care facilities. Under Title VII of the Older
Americans Act, ombudsman officers investigate
complaints by or on behalf of residents, provide
information about facilities, represent the interests
of residents before governmental agencies, and
actively seek administrative, legal, or informal
remedies. 4 They are also charged to analyze laws
pertaining to the health, safety, and welfare of res-
idents; educate consumers; and provide technical
support for the development of resident and family
councils to protect the well-being and rights of res-
idents. In 1998, more than 900 paid officers and
7,000 certified volunteers worked in 587 locations
nationwide." Under government auspices, they reg-
ularly visit facilities, monitor conditions, and "pro-
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vide a voice for those unable to speak for them-
selves." 6 They supplied information on long-term
care to some 200,000 people, and investigated
roughly the same number of complaints. The
majority of complaints dealt with lack of resident
care due to inadequate staffing, accidents, lack of
respect, and demands for care plans and resident
assessment. "7
An ombudsman's office is capable of bringing
about timely remedies in a confidential manner.
Ombudsmen can guide clients to appropriate
resources and procedures to deal with concerns.
Their role is often that of "fire-fighters" who deal
with immediate problems as efficiently as they can.
Their presence at the site of the grievance and abil-
ity to speak with those who can provide informa-
tion brings many unsatisfactory situations to an
end.
Generally, though, ombudsmen are not lawyers
and are not qualified to give legal advice. Some
cases, like suspected abuse or the denial of legal
entitlements, could be short-changed if the institu-
tion chooses only to deal with the immediate case
in the most expedient way possible. Therefore,
clients need to be made aware of the legal options
available and judge whether a court ruling would
be more appropriate in any given case.
Mediation
Mediation occurs when a neutral third party is vol-
untarily invited to assist disputing parties to
achieve a settlement. Mediators typically are
accomplished negotiators who manage the process
of bargaining between the parties. Unlike arbitra-
tors, mediators have no power to impose an out-
come on the parties. Another significant difference
is that mediators tend to have a broader view of
disputes and possible outcomes, which may be
novel or inventive when contrasted to traditional
notions of "splitting the pie."
Chris Moore, author of The Mediation Process,
suggests that when we negotiate three different
interests work simultaneously."' First, we seek to
maximize the substantive outcome. Second, we
also want to believe the process was fair and defen-
sible. And, third, we need to feel psychologically
satisfied with the settlement. The difficulty with
looking only at a substantive solution is evident in
examples such as paying for an item only to find it
on sale for half the price in a different store. We feel
aggrieved that we overspent. Moreover, whatever
price we have paid, we would probably have mis-
givings if we felt "railroaded" into an agreement, a
failure of the process. A sense of grievance also is
very likely if we feel there was no opportunity to
express our views, or if we didn't trust the person
we were dealing with. In these second and third
examples, the substantive "win" may be offset by
lack of satisfaction on the other dimensions of the
negotiation. The three aspects of successful negoti-
ation interact. For example, a customer may prefer
to pay a higher price to avoid haggling when mak-
ing a deal. In Moore's terms, this is not a bad out-
come, merely a trade of the substantive dollar
amount for a greater degree of psychological wel-
fare. Moore suggests that negotiators need to feel
satisfied in all three dimensions for an agreement to
be lasting.
Bargaining that attempts to maximally satisfy
all three dimensions of interests begins with dis-
covery of the parties' underlying concerns as
opposed to the positions that they espouse. Finding
out the reasons behind a stated claim does this. For
example, a person who disputes the level of care
provided for her husband in a nursing home may
be doing so based on comparisons with the experi-
ence of friends in similar situations, because she
feels guilty and compensates by browbeating the
facility into doing extra services, or because she
feels that the facility does poorly when compared
to others in the vicinity. When the interests have
been established-perhaps her need to justify her
actions to her peers, her need to be assured that she
is doing everything she can, or her feeling that she
is not getting value for money-general criteria for
agreement can be developed. The wife and the
facility administration can, for example, adopt fed-
eral quality of care guidelines as a threshold of
what is acceptable. They might make realistic com-
parisons with other service providers or provide
more satisfying involvement for the wife in her hus-
band's level of care.
This level of abstraction allows the parties to
generate multiple options for settlement. A key ele-
ment is for the parties to find agreement in princi-
ple, again at a fairly abstract level. Thus parties
may agree on, say, the principle of splitting assets
equally among several children regardless of their
individual needs or that "reasonable" pay in a
given position would be an average of the wage
paid for the same sort of job in the area. Many
assert that it is easier to argue rationally about the
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foundation principles than it is to haggle over spe-
cific positions.'9
Mediators can take on many roles in a negotia-
tion including, but not limited to, the following:
" Opener and facilitator of communication
channels
" Process manager who provides a procedure
and often formally chairs the negotiation ses-
sion
" Trainer who educates novice, unskilled, or
unprepared negotiators
" Resource expander who provides procedural
assistance to the parties and links them to out-
side experts and resources, such as lawyers,
technical experts, decision makers, or addi-
tional goods for exchange that may enable
them to enlarge acceptable settlement options
" Problem explorer who enables people in dis-
pute to examine a problem from a variety of
viewpoints, assists them in defining basic
issues and interests, and looks for mutually
satisfactory options
" Agent of reality who helps build a reasonable
and implementable settlement and who ques-
tions and challenges parties that have extreme
and unrealistic goals. 0
Mediation also encompasses a wide range of
approaches. Some mediators are more directive
than others are, in that they actively intervene both
in steering the process and in crafting options for
settlements.' Others see their role as facilitating
meetings and allowing the disputants to come up
with their own solutions.
Mediators usually have telephone or in-person
interviews with the parties prior to joint sessions.
Many mediators work in pairs, which gives them
greater flexibility since they don't have to simulta-
neously act as participant and observer of the nego-
tiation. A typical session will begin with an open-
ing statement by the mediator, establishing mutual-
ly acceptable ground rules. Then each side states
how they came to be in mediation, the sort of set-
tlement they are looking for, and what they believe
their alternatives are if the mediation fails to give
them a satisfactory outcome. The mediator will
probably "reframe" the issues presented in terms of
interests. Thus, a claim such as "My grandfather
will never leave the house he was born in" (a posi-
tional assertion) might be recast by the mediator as
"So, you believe that your grandfather has a strong
emotional attachment to the house he lives in?" (an
acknowledgment of one party's psychological inter-
est that shapes the pronouncement). Reframing is
often done as a question, so that the speaker may
choose whether or not the new statement is correct.
Once the various issues and interests are estab-
lished, the mediator searches for common ground
in order to establish an agreement in principle.
Both sides then collaboratively generate options for
settlement based on the interests that have been
voiced and the criteria that are mutually accept-
able. Mediators may also choose to "caucus," or
meet individually with one side or the other. The
various options are then assessed and some final
bargaining occurs.
Mediators actively seek integrative solutions,
adding to the mix of issues and resources in the dis-
pute, since one way to improve settlements is to
"expand the pie," or the range of elements in the
negotiation. The solution can then integrate new
facts or views and take some pressure away from
the matters that have been causing the most diffi-
culty. For example, children of elderly parents
arguing over how to divide a given amount of time
spent caring for the parents may not be aware of
subsidized third-party care, which would widen the
range of possibilities open to them. Adding third-
party care may raise issues of who pays, who
supervises, and whether the care is appropriate, but
the additional help eases the current dilemma.
Because mediation is not limited to simply allocat-
ing resources, settlements may be creative, novel,
and legally unenforceable, yet parties will agree to
them because they "own" the solution-rather
than having it imposed on them-and believe it to
be workable. Such discussions and settlements
often are a more effective means of addressing
issues such as anger or a need for respect than
either positional bargaining or legal adjudication.
Mediation is especially effective where the dis-
putants must or choose to continue their relation-
ship beyond the immediate negotiation, as in fami-
ly disputes or workplace issues where termination
is not an option. It holds the possibility of educat-
ing the parties to deal with each other more effec-
tively in the future. It is also very useful where set-
tlement is complex since the issues are difficult to
quantify since they are not limited to monetary
awards or time allocations, such as multiparty or
intrafamily disputes. Mediation is also most appro-
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priate when the psychological aspects of the dis-
pute are as important as the substantive issues,
including cases in which an apology or taking the
time to listen to concerns matters as much to a dis-
putant as any eventual award. As Lisi and Burns, of
the Center for Social Gerontology in Ann Arbor,
Michigan, suggest:
[T]hrough mediation, the family may for the first time
be able to focus on the needs of the proposed ward
and the importance of having the care givers and fam-
ily working together to provide the necessary care for
the person.... Mediation offers a way to explore the
real abilities and needs of the proposed ward, find ser-
vices that can provide those needs, and work out con-
flicts while serving both the autonomy of the older or
disabled person and improving family relationships.'
Mediation as guided problem-solving is not
appropriate for every dispute. For success, both
negotiating parties must at least make a commit-
ment to the process of interest-based bargaining.
They must be willing accept the mediator's tech-
niques, which are likely to include open disclosure
and treating the situation as a problem to be over-
come rather than a contest to be won. Mediation
presumes that people recognize what they want,
that they are capable of autonomous choices, and
that they will be able to articulate their desired out-
come.
Some personality types and some kinds of dis-
putes may not be suited to mediation because there
is either no willingness to settle or the parties have
a psychological need to engage in win/lose negotia-
tion. In other cases, there may be no way to extend
the amount of resources brought into the negotia-
tion, and there are no other interests involved. This
would be the case, for example, where two insur-
ance adjusters meet to come to a financial settle-
ment. In this kind of case, the question simply
becomes one of allocation based on set guidelines.
Interest-based bargaining has great potential for
reaching lasting settlements that satisfy specific
interests in a way that promotes trust and good
relationships. However, it does not automatically
turn difficult disputes into ones that are easily
resolvable. It takes time, a cooperative environ-
ment, and a willingness to disclose on the part of
the parties. It is also quite a complex process
requiring skill and practice. Everyone negotiates
every day, but rarely with the creativity and trust
that interest-based bargaining requires. In cases
where the desired outcome is less clear than a
black-and-white solution, interest-based bargain-
ing does seem to offer a way for disputants to reach
agreement so that both parties can feel satisfied,
rather than one coming out as the loser. Empirical
evidence suggests that mediated agreements are
quicker, less expensive, and achieve more satisfac-
tory solutions than litigated ones.23
Qualifications and Licensure
Mediators tend to come from two backgrounds,
either the law or the therapeutic professions, like
counseling or social work. At present, there are no
standard qualifications for mediators, with the
result that anyone can put himself or herself for-
ward as a qualified mediator. Court-appointed
mediators, however, are subject to minimum quali-
fications in at least 11 states.24 These credentials
typically involve completing a course of training in
mediation (usually between 25 and 40 hours) by an
approved provider. Florida is perhaps the most
stringent, requiring 20 hours of training and four
observed mediations for county court mediators,
and 40 hours of training, observed mediation ses-
sions and supervised sessions, and bar membership
for circuit court mediators. Florida family media-
tors require 40 hours of training, a relevant
advanced degree or certification, two observed ses-
sions, and two supervised sessions. Critics of cre-
dential requirements have claimed that some of the
most able mediators do not have degrees, that
mediation is as much intuitive as learned, and that
bar membership, for example, effectively turns
mediation into a franchise of the legal profession.5
A mediator may be associated with any of sev-
eral professional associations, including the nation-
al Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution
(SPIDR) and the American Arbitration Association
(AAA), and similar state organizations.26
Membership in a professional organization does
not, by itself, guarantee a level of expertise,
although one of the hallmarks of membership is
adherence to a code of conduct for mediators. The
ABA, AAA, and SPIDR have a joint set of stan-
dards of conduct. 27 The section of that code on
mediator competence states that mediators may be
selected solely on the basis of client acceptance,
although they recommend training and experience.
It recommends that mediators should have infor-
mation available for parties outlining their back-
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ground and qualifications. Social workers who act
as mediators have additional duties outlined under
the National Association of Social Workers
Standards of Practice, which requires additional
training and education in dispute resolution theo-
ry. 8 Individuals seeking mediation services should
therefore be diligent in finding out the level of
training and experience of individual mediators,
whether they belong to a professional association,
and if they are associated with a mediation organi-
zation that provides continuing education and
feedback.
Courts have not yet recognized mediator mal-
practice. Because of disparate training and stan-
dards, mere ineptitude has not been actionable. It is
plausible that mediators may be found guilty of
malpractice based on standards of care derived
from rules governing their professions of origin,
such as social worker or psychologist. However,
this is less likely to prevail if the mediator disclaims
that profession while acting as a neutral.
Lawyers practicing mediation may face conflict-
ing duties and be bound to disclosure or with-
drawal from future dealings with the parties. ABA
Model Rule 5.7 deals with the conduct of lawyers
in providing other services "that might reasonably
be performed in conjunction with and in substance
are related to the provision of legal services, and
that are not prohibited as unauthorized practice of
law when provided by a non-lawyer."" In
Pennsylvania, Bar Opinion 96-39 clearly states that
the mediation entity should not serve the firm's
clients, and the firm not take on any mediation cus-
tomers as clients. Further, participants in mediation
must not be led to believe that they are receiving
legal services. States have differed on whether
mediation participants may subsequently be repre-
sented by the mediator-lawyer in any matter that
pertains to the mediation."
Attorneys also need to be aware that mediators
are not advocates for either side. Rather, they have
a professional duty to all parties at the table, even
if only one side pays for the session. A lawyer
should not give legal advice while serving as a
mediator,3' and it is generally recommended that
the parties consult another lawyer for help in the
drafting and review of final agreements.
Confidentiality
Mediation is a confidential process, and most con-
tracts to mediate will demand confidentiality from
all parties. Generally, all settlement conferences are
covered by Rule 408 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence.32 The intention behind this is that indi-
viduals may state facts, explore issues, or extend
offers more freely than they would if they knew
that anything they said could potentially be used
against them in court. Given this security, dis-
putants may be encouraged to speak about their
motives and their true bottom line. They need not
posture or "play to the gallery"; as a result, discus-
sions can be frank and open. Most states have
statutes giving almost blanket confidentiality to
mediation sessions. Although mediators have been
subpoenaed, courts have generally held that main-
taining the process as an expeditious way to settle
disputes is a greater public interest than revelation
of facts in particular disputes.33
Power Imbalances
Mediators often claim to be process managers. This
has generated some criticism, in that a truly neutral
mediator may perpetuate existing power balances.
For example, consider the instance of an elderly
couple who is in dispute over the best way to dis-
perse their assets among the children. It would not
be unusual for one spouse to have made the impor-
tant financial decisions throughout the marriage
and to expect to continue to do so. This expecta-
tion is likely to extend even to a mediation setting.
That individual's superior power is unlike a litiga-
tion setting where, in theory at least, litigants come
to the courthouse steps with equal power because
they are represented by attorneys. Mediation has
no similar safeguards.
Power imbalance is a serious concern, especial-
ly when mediation may involve traditionally under-
empowered groups. For example, a patient, typi-
cally seen in a passive and obedient role, may be
reluctant to question authority figures, while a sur-
geon may be used to and comfortable in giving
unequivocal recommendations. 3' The mediator
considers whether and how the power imbalance
affects the negotiation and result. The mediator
could justify allowing a negotiation with one side
seemingly less powerful than the other, since any
mediation is voluntary. However, the mediator may
act to make sure that both sides come to the nego-
tiation fully informed and autonomous. One sim-
ple technique is asking questions of the less power-
ful negotiator, such as "Is that what you really
want at this point?" or "Do you think you may
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regret this decision when you look back on it in five
years time?" Thus, despite a power imbalance, the
less able negotiator may nevertheless be willing and
able to reach an acceptable settlement.
Another option is for the mediator to act as a
coach (but not an advocate) for one party, helping
to articulate concerns and frame issues in a way
that is more likely to lead to a lasting settlement.
Perhaps an elderly patient does not want to under-
go any more hospitalization, even at the risk of
shortening his life. We can imagine that a mediator
could help him express that wish in a way that
causes the surgeon to respect the patient's
autonomous choice.
In a sense, this departs from mediator neutrali-
ty. However, the mediator can provide this guid-
ance openly and with the consent of the "stronger"
party. The mediator may explain that it is in the
surgeon's ultimate interests to allow the mediator
to assist the patient despite his belief that treatment
is medically necessary, since the patient who is
effectively bullied into consent may be resentful
and angry regardless of the medical result. Though
the mediated outcome runs counter to medical
advice, it minimizes subsequent exposure to legal
action. A mediator should inform both clients
about his or her approach and gain their consent
for continuing the mediation.
Choosing the Appropriate Forum
Disputants have a number of choices in attempting
to resolve their differences beyond private negotia-
tion. Let us consider a short case:
A nursing home failed to follow an Advanced
Directive for a deceased resident, leading to extensive
life support and substantial extra costs. The daughter
refused to pay these, and was taken to court by man-
agement."
As with most cases, the legal issues are not com-
pletely clear, and it is uncertain who would prevail
in court. This means that the parties are likely to be
engaged in adversarial proceedings, at considerable
cost, over a period of many months or years. Given
that alternative, it is probably in the interests of
both parties to attempt ADR.
As it turned out, this dispute was resolved in
mediation, although either arbitration or interven-
tion by an ombudsman also could have been effec-
tive. The daughter had a deep need to express her
anger and frustration at seeing her mother's pro-
longed suffering. This prompted the manager to
apologize for having lost the advance directive and
starting resuscitation. Once the emotional issues
had been aired, the manager offered to withdraw
the bill for the extra costs, if the daughter paid the
rest of the outstanding care bill. The daughter
agreed and said that her mother had otherwise
always been very happy at the home.
This sort of solution would be acceptable under
current mediation practice since the daughter has
had her psychological, process, and substantive
interests served to her personal satisfaction.
However, though the case may seem to be a clear
success story for ADR, there may be reasons to
object to this conclusion. First, the daughter might
be owed significant compensation under previous
court rulings if the case were litigated, yet she has
agreed to accept the manager's offer to waive the
extra bill. There is little possibility of complaining
of the mediated agreement in a future court action.
Also, if there are few precedents for the type of dis-
pute, others might be assisted by the record of the
litigation in which the courts set a precedent of
appropriate action in the case of failure to comply
with advanced directives. The mediation, of course,
is confidential and lacks any public record. Some
critics of mediation suggest that the daughter is a
victim of "second-class justice," deprived of her
legal rights and remedies." If a whole class of dis-
putes of a certain type were subject only to media-
tion, no precedents to establish a guide for justice
through the courts can develop.
The Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of
1990 advises that agencies consider not using ADR
in the following circumstances:
1. When an authoritative precedent is needed;
2. When uniformity of result is important for pol-
icy reasons, and the use of ADR might result in
different decisions;
3. When the matter significantly affects persons or
groups that are not parties to the proceeding;
4. When a full public record is important; or
5. When the matter is one over which the agency
will maintain continuing jurisdiction, with
authority to alter the disposition in the light of
changed circumstances. 7
These cautions need not deal a mortal blow to
ADR. It holds the promise of efficient, nonadver-
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sarial, and lasting settlements. Many clients would
prefer instant remedies to having their cases serve
as tests for determining social policy. Nevertheless,
the cautions demonstrate that parties who use
ADR should do so with full awareness of what the
processes entail and the possible awards they may
forgo when they don't go to court. Moreover, any-
one who considers ADR ought to be clear about
the wider implications of their actions if they wish
to provide a test of the issues that may benefit oth-
ers, or if they want the gravity of a traditional judi-
cial decision for themselves.
Institutions should implement safeguards to
ensure that all cases proposed for ADR are
screened for suitability before being sent to private
resolution mechanisms. The District of Columbia
Department of Human Rights, for example, retains
all class actions or complaints against repeat
offenders for enforcement. 8 The department refers
many individual complaints-including those of
seniors-for mediation by the Center for Dispute
Resolution in Washington, D.C.
Finally, these cautions about ADR reinforce the
claim that lawyers should have an active role in
monitoring cases diverted from the traditional jus-
tice system and in reviewing agreements drafted in
informal negotiations.
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